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Abstract
We consider two common modes of judicial resolution: judicial discretion, where the
judge or jury has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy, and winner take all where
the remedy is pre-determined by the governing substantive law. We analyze these
systems in light of the fact that pre-trial bargainers have been shown to have excessive
condence in their own positions. We nd theoretically that winner-take-all rules
magnify the e¤ects of over-condence and diminish the likelihood of settling relative
to judicial discretion. We conrm our model with a laboratory experiment showing
signicantly fewer pre-trial agreements under winner-take-all. These results imply that
increasing judicial discretion in fashioning remedies could increase pre-trial agreements
and promote e¢ ciency. This has implications for many areas of law, including donative
transfers, property law, patent infringements, and agreements on liquidated damages.
We would like to thank the American College of Trust and Estates Council Foundation, and the National
Science Foundation (through grant numbers SES-0320106 and SES-0551296 to Andreoni) for nancial sup-
port. We are also grateful to Linda Babcock, Honourable Herbert P. Wilkins (Chief Justice, Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, retired) and Honourable Edward M. Ginsburg (Massachusetts Probate and Family
Court Judge, retired) for their help in formulating our experiment, to Max Bazerman, Vincent Crawford,
Stephen Leider, and Muhamet Yildiz for extremely helpful comments, and to Megan Watson and Justin Rao
for expert research assistance.
1 Introduction
When parties to a law suit fail to settle, the case will appear before a court. Depending on
the substantive law governing the dispute, the decision maker, be it judge or jury, will either
have broad discretion in establishing the amount awarded to the prevailing party, or have no
discretion in fashioning a remedy because the law imposes a winner-take-all system. Through
theory and experiments we show that winner-take-all leads to signicantly more bargaining
delays and disagreements than cases where the decision maker has broader discretion. Such
a nding has important consequences for how we design mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Our analysis is motivated by a puzzling observation from legal scholars. They have noted
that when a decedents will is challenged, these disputes reach out-of-court settlements at a
far lower rate than other civil litigation. According to empirical studies, while fewer than
8% of other civil litigation requires a court to resolve the case (Trubek, et al.1983), 40% of
disputed wills do (Schoenblum, 1987).1 What could account for this ve-fold di¤erence in
rates of disagreement?
In probing this question, Mado¤ (2002) notes a number of di¤erences between will dis-
putes and other litigation. The claims in a contested will or other donative transfer often
center on questions about the true intent of a person who is no longer living, and often
have strong emotional or moral components. Each of these could a¤ect parties willingness
to settle. Another distinguishing factor of these types of disputes, and the one that we ex-
plore in this paper, is the fact that judges lack discretion in fashioning remedies for disputes
involving donative transfers (transfers by gift and at death). If a will or gift is challenged, a
judge resolving that dispute can only either uphold or reject the transfer. A judge does not
1Objective evidence on this is di¢ cult to collect, as court records on will disputes are maintained in local
probate courts. These courts typically do not have funding that would allow them to aid in research, and,
additionally, often maintain records in ways that make them di¢ cult to study. Despite these obstacles,
Schoenblum (1987) examined nine years of probate records for a single county and found 38% were resolved
through out-of-court settlements and 22% were dismissed either voluntarily or involuntarily. The rest, 40%,
were resolved through a trial. There is also subjective evidence gained though interviews with probate
attorneys and judges that corroborate these statistics. See Mado¤ (2002) for a detailed discussion of this
evidence.
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have any equitable authority to fashion a remedy particular to the situation the judgement
is winner-take-all. This is unlike many other civil disputes where the judicial decision-maker
has far greater discretion in determining awards. For example, in torts cases, the issue of
damages is highly fact-sensitive and is subject to varying assessments of value, particularly
for non-economic damages such as pain and su¤ering. Likewise, in contract cases there
are a variety of standards that a judge can use in assessing damages that can result in the
prevailing parties receiving widely varying amounts. The winner-take-all aspect of wills
law in the United States is also unlike wills law in other common law countries, including
England, Australia and New Zealand, where judges have equitable powers to alter the plan
of disposition under an otherwise valid will.
How could the winner-take-all doctrine a¤ect settlement? Since winner-take-all obviously
increases the risk faced by litigants, one might predict that agreements would be more
frequent under winner-take-all than judicial discretion. Since this contradicts the facts, risk
aversion cannot explain the di¤erence we observe.
Overcondence is perhaps the most common and well-established reason for a failure to
reach agreement through negotiation.2 The natural question is, therefore, does winner-take-
all somehow heighten the negative consequences of overcondence? Our hypothesis is that
it does and that this e¤ect is likely to be responsible for the empirical nding of greater
rates of disagreement under winner-take-all. Intuitively, an overcondent bargainer assigns
unrealistically high likelihood to winningand thus believes the expected benets of going
to court are higher than they actually are. Relative to judicial discretion, winner-take-
all concentrates the payments of winning on the most extreme outcomes possible, thereby
increasing a biased litigants expected returns from going to court. That is, litigants who
may have agreed under judicial discretion could nd the contract zone is empty if they switch
to winner-take-all.3 We formalize this intuition in a theoretical model.
2Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) provide a nice summary of the experimental literature. See Yildiz
(2004) for a recent theoretical contribution. We review this literature in section 2 below.
3Another way of thinking of this issue is that judicial discretion serves to temper the self-serving bias in
that someone who thinks they have a winning case will nonetheless recognize that they cannot know how a
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The laboratory test of our theory asks subjects to assume the roles of litigants in a
disputed will and donative transfer. Litigants negotiate in a computer chatroom for-
mat. There are two conditions, reecting either winner-take-all or judicial discretion. As
predicted, subjects in both conditions exhibit similar degrees of overcondence, but have a
signicantly greater likelihood of disagreement under winner-take-all.
Although our discussion is in terms of wills law, our hypothesis also applies broadly to
circumstances where, by law or by contract, the institution limits the discretion of a judge or
other decision maker in fashioning a remedy. One area where this applies is private contracts
that include xed penalties for breach, called liquidated damages. These clauses may have
the e¤ect of making recontracting more di¢ cult if the parties su¤er from overcondence,
resulting in lower e¢ ciency. Moreover, most property cases involving contested ownership,
such as disputed property lines, abandoned property, and squattersrights, are subject to
winner-take-all rules. Our theory is particularly relevant to remedies in patent disputes and
the recent Supreme Court case on this issue in connection with the buy nowbutton used
by the Internet company eBay. We treat this case this in more detail in our discussion.
Our general claim is that granting greater discretion to a judge or decision maker in the
event of a disagreement is likely to increase the propensity of overcondent litigants to settle
the case, thus increasing economic e¢ ciency.
In the next section we provide more detail on wills, legal doctrine, and overcondence.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 describes our experimental design, and
section 5 provides the results. In section 6 we summarize our ndings and discuss their
consequences for the law and for behavioral issues in economics.
judge or jury will exercise discretion.
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2 Background
2.1 Law of Donative Transfers
Under American law, unmarried individuals are free to dispose of their property as they
see t.4 This is unlike the law in most other parts of the world, which requires that an
individual share a portion of his or her estate with children and other relatives.5 This right
to transmit property can be exercised during life, through lifetime gifts, or at death through
a will. The only limitations on this right are, rst, that the transfer must conform with the
legal formalities required for the transfer (for instance, if it is a will, it must be signed in the
presence of two witnesses who also sign the will, and if it is a gift, there must be delivery
and acceptance of the property); and second, the person making the transfer must have the
requisite intent to make the transfer.6 A person lacks the requisite mental intent when he
is under undue inuence. A person is considered to be under undue inuence when he is
subject to another persons exertion of control such that he takes actions which are di¤erent
from his true wishes.
If a person makes a transfer that meets the formal requirements and has su¢ cient mental
capacity, then the transfer is e¤ective. If a person makes a transfer that fails to meet the
formal requirements or the person lacks the requisite mental capacity, then the transfer is
not e¤ective. A judges authority in a donative transfer case is limited to either upholding
or negating the transfer. A judge does not have the right to exercise discretion in fashioning
a remedy. This is unlike the law of many other common law countries, in which a court has
broad discretionary rights to make a fairdisposition of a decedents estate. Nor is it like
4Depending on the state, married individuals may be required to transfer a portion of their property to
their spouse. See Ray D. Mado¤, Cornelia R. Tenney and Martin A. Hall, Practical Guide to Estate Planning
§6.02 (2008).
5Most civil law systems provide for a form of forced heirship in which children and other relatives are
entitled to a portion of the decedents estate (De Waal, 2006). Our closest legal relatives, the common law
countries of England, Australia, New Zealand, as well as some provinces of Canada, have enacted Family
Maintenance Statutes that allow a judge to alter the disposition of a persons property for the benet of
family members. For a discussion of this issue, and related references, see Mado¤ (2002).
6This is called donative intentfor gifts and testamentary intentfor wills.
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other civil suits where judges have a great deal of discretion in awarding a remedy.
2.2 Evidence of Overcondence in Bargaining
Overcondence, excessive optimism, self-serving bias, and non-common priors are terms
used in the literature to represent the idea that an individual has unrealistically favorable
expectations for the consequences of disagreement.
The evidence for overcondence is extremely strong, and is spelled out nicely in a review
by Babcock and Loewenstein (1997). They catalogue an extensive psychology literature
that shows that people have a basic tendency towards self-serving interpretations, especially
when there are several possible focal pointsfor what could be seen as fair or reasonable.
Babcock and Loewenstein then discuss an important series of papers by themselves and
coauthors (most notably Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein, 1996, and Babcock, Loewentein,
Isacharo¤, and Camerer, 1995) that show the persistence of self-serving bias in experimental
settings. A typical experiment asked subjects, who were students from university courses,
to play the roles of litigants. Roles as plainti¤ and defendant were assigned randomly.
Subjects were given identical case materials to review and, before negotiating, were asked
for their best guess of the judges ruling on damages in the event the case goes to court.
Subjects then had a set amount of time to negotiate, and if they failed to reach agreement
in this time they would go to court and receive the judges ruling. The authors found
that the plainti¤s consistently estimated the judges ruling to be higher than the defendants
estimates, indicating a signicant self-serving bias. Moreover, this bias was a signicant
predictor of disagreement in pre-trial bargaining. In fact, Babcock, Loewenstein and Wang
(1995) show that the self-serving biases can cause the contract zone the set of possible
agreements that make both sides better o¤ than they expect to be by going to court to
disappear.
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2.3 Comparison to Arbitration in Contract Negotiations
Judicial discretion and winner-take-all each bear some resemblance to dispute resolution
mechanisms often discussed in the literature on contract negotiations, namely conventional
arbitration and nal o¤er arbitration. Conventional arbitration is similar to judicial dis-
cretion in that the arbitrator typically has broad discretion in his choice of remedy. Final
o¤er arbitration (FOA), on the other hand, limits the discretion of the arbitrator in that
each party submits a proposed settlement amount to the arbitrator, who then must choose
one of the two o¤ers submitted. Evidence from both the laboratory and the eld show that
parties are more likely to settle prior to a decision being rendered when they participate in
FOA as opposed to conventional arbitration (see, for example, Neale and Bazerman, 1983,
Ashenfelter, Curie, Farber, and Spiegel, 1992, and Dickinson, 2004).
At rst glance, the literature on FOA seems to contradict our ndings because conven-
tional arbitration resembles judicial discretion, and FOA appears similar to winner-take all,
yet FOA results in more settlements than conventional arbitration. However, there is an
important distinction between FOA and the all-or-nothing judicial mechanism that we are
studying. Namely, in FOA, the potential remedies are determined by the bargainers them-
selves. This gives each side an incentive to make nal o¤ers that are closer to the preferences
of the arbitrator in hopes of being chosen over the nal o¤er of their opponent, thus bring-
ing the two sides together (Farber and Bazerman, 1986). This suggests that the increased
settlement rates in FOA is prompted by something other than the limited discretion by the
decision-maker. This makes the ndings of the increased e¢ ciency of FOA largely inapposite
to our situation.
There is one aspect of the FOA literature however that is relevant That is, Dickinson
(2006) has shown that even in FOA, the e¤ect of self-serving optimism is to attenuate the
benets of FOA and, with extreme enough optimism, can even cause FOA to fail.
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2.4 Theories of Overcondence in Bargaining
Excessive optimism has also been at the root of several theoretical models of disagreement
in bargaining, such as Landes (1971) and Posner (1972) who show optimism can cause dis-
agreement. Recently, Muhamet Yildiz has produced an interesting series of papers showing
that under certain conditions optimism in bargaining may not lead to delay or disagreement.
He assumes bargainers have opportunities to make proposals at randomly determined times,
and individuals may be optimistic about when they will next get a chance to make an o¤er.
In Yildiz (2003), he shows that if the bargaining horizon is short, this optimism can lead to
disagreement the contract zone can be an empty set. If the horizon is su¢ ciently long, how-
ever, and people remain su¢ ciently optimistic then immediate agreement may be possible.
Loosely speaking, if there will be many opportunities to make o¤ers over an extended period,
discounting by bargainers can cause the contract zone to open up. In Yildiz (2004), he
broadens the model to include learning and shows that once again optimism can cause delay
in agreement, but only as it interacts with learning and if people are su¢ ciently patient. As
Yildiz concedes, however, he cannot deny the importance of optimism in disagreement and
delay in bargaining, but instead sees his papers a rst step towards a more careful analysis
of optimism and the important role it plays in negotiation(2003, p.796).
The model of bargaining that comes closest to capturing the e¤ects we are discussing here
is by Olszewski (2006), who explores the welfare di¤erences between conventional arbitration
and nal-o¤er arbitration. In one of the models he presents, he assumes bargainers have
di¤erent self-serving priors about what the arbitrator will decide. Furthermore, each party
believes that their opponent is biased, that they themselves are not biased, and that the
arbitrator shares their own point of view. While each bargainer believes the arbitrator is
unbiased, the arbitrators decision is still taken to be uncertain. In particular, there is
an unbiased error in the arbitrators belief about which bargainers position is correct.
He shows that in nal-o¤er arbitration the bargainers will exaggeratetheir nal o¤ers in
equilibrium in order to take advantage of the perceived bias of their opponent. The only
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thing that keeps them from stating innite o¤ers is that the potential error on the part of the
arbitrator. Unfortunately for our purposes, Olszewski makes the simplifying assumption that
imply overcondence is essentially a binary variable bargainers either see the facts clearly
(and thus agree) or one or both maintain a bias and both are perfectly (although perhaps
erroneously) convinced of their positions and believe equally strongly that the arbitrator will
agree with them. In addition, he assumes that the arbitrator either sides perfectly with
one of the negotiators or is indi¤erent. These assumptions makes agreement insensitive
to increases in subjective expected returns from disagreement. If we replace Olszewskis
informational assumptions with assumptions similar to those we make in the next section,
his approach will likely lead to the conclusions we propose next.
3 Theoretical Analysis
This section presents theoretical analysis in support of our hypothesis. Our objective is not
to present a full blown model of bargaining, but simply take the rst step needed to solve
any bargaining model, which is to identify the contract zone. The contract zone is the set
of possible agreements that would leave both players at least as well o¤ as they expect to
be by going to court. The objective is to show that a winner-take-all judicial doctrine, in
the presence of optimism, can cause the contract zone to shrink or disappear relative to the
case of judicial discretion. A motivation for this approach can be drawn from the industrial
relations literature which typically measures the probability of reaching a settlement without
intervention of a court or other arbitrator by the size of the contract zone (see, for instance,
Farber, 1980, and Farber and Bazerman, 1986). Given that we establish the starting
position for negotiation, researchers can then apply their favorite models of bargaining to
generate predictions about agreement, such as a modication of the model of Olszewski
(2006) noted above.
While there is intuitive appeal to the notion that a smaller contract zone means greater
likelihood of delay or disagreement, one should be careful to note that for most theoretical
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approaches simply showing a smaller contract zone does not necessarily translate into longer
delay or greater likelihood of disagreement (Crawford, 1979, 1981). Many standard models
of negotiation, for instance, predict agreement as long as the contract zone is not empty.
In applying these models, however, one would only need to acknowledge that our approach
shows that the contract zone is more likely to be empty under winner-take-all to generate
the desired prediction. At the end of this section we provide a simple numerical example
to show how the contract zone can be much more likely to be empty under winner-take-all
than under greater judicial discretion.
The theory we present can be interpreted as providing a foundation for a model of
bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. It has been shown that in such cases that
agreement is not assured, even when the contract zone is non-empty, and that the likelihood
of agreement is increasing in the size of the contract zone (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983,
and Ausebel, Cramton, and Deneckere, 2002).
3.1 Setup
Assume two individuals, A and B, are litigants. Normalize the claims and court costs such
that Person A claims that he is owed $1 that is currently held by B. If A and B fail to
reach a negotiated settlement, the case will go to court. Let p represent the courts view of
the probability that As claim as valid. A stronger case by A yields a higher p: Let x be the
nal award that the court gives to A. Then we will make the following assumptions about
how, upon forming p, the court must rule under the two doctrines:
Winner-take-all: If p > 1=2 the judge must rule in favor of A, choosing x = 1, otherwise
x = 0:
Judicial Discretion: The award will be proportional to the probability that As case is valid,
so x = p:
Assume a litigant views p as a random variable with a probability distribution function
f(p), 0  p  1. Let p be the expected value of p.
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Assume there are no costs to negotiation, but that a court hearing will cost ci, where
0  ci  1, i = A;B, and cA + cB < 1. Costs are assumed to be the same under both
doctrines.7
We make two more assumptions about individuals. First, we make the standard assump-
tion that litigants are risk neutral. We discuss the consequences of adding risk aversion later
in the paper, but, as already noted, risk aversion will work against our hypothesis. Second,
we assume that if individuals are overcondent then they are unaware of their own bias or
their own potential to be biased, and that overcondence is not the result of strategic play.
This is consistent with the laboratory research if subjects see a breakdown in negotiations,
they tend to assume the other party is biased, but not themselves (Babcock and Loewenstein,
1997).
3.2 Litigants Have Common Beliefs
Here we show that if there is no overcondence then winner-take-all and judicial discre-
tion doctrines yield contract zones of identical size. Specically, we assume litigants share
common beliefs on the distribution of potential decisions by the court.8
First consider the doctrine of judicial discretion. For A the expected outcome of the
trial is p and thus the expected value of going to court is vA = p  cA. Likewise, for B the
expected value is vB = 1  p  cB. Let s be the settlement that B agrees to pay to A: Any
s 2 [p  cA; p+ cB] will make both A and B at least as well of as going to court. This is the
contract zone as long as there are extra costs in going to court, we would always predict
agreement is possible.
Now consider winner-take-all. Let  =
R 1
1=2
f(p)dp be the the probability that p > 1=2.
For A the expected outcome of the trial is  and thus the expected value of going to court
is vA =    cA. Likewise, for B the expected value is vB = 1     cB. The contract zone
is now any s 2 [   cA;  + cB].
7Note, both the pie and the costs have been scaled by the same factor.
8The results of this subsection can be derived under some special cases of disparate beliefs. Since there
is nothing inherently interesting about these special cases, we assume common beliefs for simplicity.
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In both of these cases, the width of the contract zone is cA + cB: It follows that typical
models of bargaining would proceed to predict that outcome will be the same under both
doctrines.9
3.3 Overcondent Litigants
The literature has dened overcondence to mean litigants have either self-serving expecta-
tions of the judges award, or having excessive condence of winningin court relative to
the true probability. What matters for our analysis, however, is simply that the litigants
have a biasrelative to each other. In particular, this means A sees those values of p > 1=2
to be as at least as likely as B sees them to bo, while those values of p  1=2 are seen as no
more likely to A than to B: 10
Let (p) be the p.d.f. perceived by A, and (p) be the p.d.f. perceived by B. Then we
assume (p) and (p) satisfy these three conditions: i) 0  (p)  (p) for 0  p  1=2,





(p)dp = 1: Another way to state
these conditions is that (p) rst-order stochastically dominates (p) with a crossing of the
p.d.f.s at p = 1=2. If these conditions are satised, then we can say that A and B are
overcondent relative to each other.11 Note the generality of this denition in that it does
not depend on the true p:d:f:, but just the relative beliefs of the two litigants.
Begin again with judicial discretion. We know that expected value of p by A, pA, will
be higher than the expected value of B, pB, that is pA =
R 1
0
p(p)dp  R 1
0
p(p)dp = pB.
The contract zone is now [pA   cA; pB + cB]: However, since pB  pA; this contract zone is
9See, for instance, Crawfords (1979) comparison of convention and nal o¤er arbitration for a related
result. Obviously, this only holds for risk neutral bargainers.
10As in the last subsection, this assumption is stricter than is necessary since the results would also hold
under a broader set of disparate beliefs than permitted by this denition. Again, since there is nothing
inherently interesting about these special cases, we use this denition of bias because it is most natural and
provides for simplicity.
11Obviously, these assumptions are only su¢ cient conditions for our result. If (p) and (p) deviate
modestly from these conditions, our predictions will still hold. However, there appears to be no general
characterization of types of deviations that would be allowed, but rather would depend on the full shape of
the (p)   (p). As will be seen in our proof and numerical example, there is likely be a great degree of
tolerance for deviations from these three assumptions in our prediction.
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shrinking relative to the unbiased case. If the biases are so severe that pA   cA > pB + cB
then the contract zone disappears and no negotiated settlement is possible.
What about winner-take-all? Let A =
R 1
1=2
(p)dp be As belief on the probability of
winning. Likewise, let B =
R 1
1=2
(p)dp be Bs belief of the probability of losing. As before,
our assumptions imply that B  A: The new contract zone is [A   cA; B + cB], which is
clearly smaller than the unbiased zone. Again, if the biases are so big that A cA > B+cB
then no agreements are possible.
3.4 Overcondence and Judicial Doctrine
Our claim here is that under winner-take-all the same biases will lead to a larger reduction
in and more likely elimination of the contract zone than under judicial discretion. With
our theoretical framework, this reduces to a claim that pA   pB  A   B. This is simple
to demonstrate:















= A   B:
The rst step follows from the assumption that (p)  (p) for p  1=2, while the second
step follows from the assumption that (p)  (p) for p > 1=2:
This indicates not only that the contract zone shrinks with overcondence, but that it
shrinks more under winner-take-all. Intuitively, winner-take-all concentrates the bias on the
most favorable outcome of winning it all, and, in e¤ect, magnies the over-estimation of an
expected court decision. Thus, agreements that would have been possible under judicial
discretion are no longer feasible for winner-take-all. In fact, cases may arise in which
agreement is possible for judicial discretion but impossible for winner-take-all.12
12Looking at the mathematics above, it is easy to see how exceptions to assumptions (i) and (ii) can be
12
3.5 Example
To illustrate this nding, suppose an unbiased litigant would believe that p is distributed
uniformly, so f(p) = 1; 0  p  1: Then p =  = 1=2:
Assume that As belief about this distribution is biased. In particular, assume (p) =
1  a; for 0  p  1=2 and (p) = 1 + a for 1=2 < p  1: Similarly, assume Bs beliefs are
(p) = 1 + b for 0 < p  1=2 and (p) = 1  b for 1=2  p  1: Of course, 0 < a; b < 1:
>From these it is easy to calculate pA =
R 1=2
0
p(1  a)dp+ R 1
1=2
p(1 + a)dp = (1  a)=8 +
3(1 + a)=8 = 1=2 + a=4: Similarly, pB = 1=2  b=4: The contract zone under the doctrine of
judicial discretion is s 2 [1=2+ a=4  cA; 1=2  b=4+ cB]. If (a+ b)=4 > cA+ cB the contract
zone will disappear.
Turning to winner-take-all, we nd A =
R 1
1=2
(1 + a)dp = 1=2 + a=2: Likewise, B =
1=2   b=2. Now the contract zone becomes s 2 [1=2 + =2   cA; 1=2   b=2 + cB]: This is
clearly a smaller contract zone. Moreover, if (a + b)=2 > cA + cB then the contract zone
vanishes and no agreement is possible. Hence, for a given set of biases, disagreement and
delay is far more likely under winner-take-all.
To illustrate this with numbers, suppose that each side believes their chance of the judge
nding their case is valid is 60%, rather than the unbiased 50%, that is, A = 1 B = 0:6: It
is easy to see that this means a = b = 0:2: Thus, in the case of judicial discretion, there can
be agreements only if 0:1  cA + cB; that is, if total litigation costs exceed 10% of the value
of the stakes being bargained over. Turning to winner-take-all, there can only be agreement
if 0:2  cA+ cB, that is, if total litigation costs exceed 20% of the stakes. As can be seen in
this example, rather slight overcondence can lead to much greater hazard of disagreement
under winner-take-all.
handled, and that each deviation will need to be considered as a special case. Nonetheless, the slack left when




As in prior studies of pre-trial bargaining, our experiment asks student volunteers to assume
the roles of two people in a disputed will. This section will rst describe the scenario and
the manipulation we use to test our hypotheses, then present the specic details of how the
design was implemented.
4.1 Bargaining Scenarios and Manipulation
We constructed a situation, loosely based on a real case, in which a brother and sister are
in disagreement about $800,000 in their mothers estate. In the scenario, the sister, a
struggling artist and a single parent, had recently moved from New York to live with her
elderly mother. While she was able to live rent-free, the move arguably also derailed her
chances of being a successful artist. The brother, in the mean time, was a single man living
in Washington pursuing a highly successful and lucrative career as an attorney. Busy with
his career, he rarely visited his mother. Near the end, the mother had become ill, was often
confused, and became increasingly dependant on her daughter to make decisions for her.
For years the mothers will had stipulated that the estate should be divided evenly be-
tween her children. However, three months prior to her death, the sister drove her mother to
the bank where the mother withdrew $800,000 from her own account and deposited it in the
account of the sister, thus removing the money from the estate and reducing the brothers
inheritance by $400,000.
The brothers claim is that the mothers true wish was to divide her estate evenly as
specied in her will and that the $800,000 gift was the result of the sisters exertion of undue
inuence on the mother. He is asking that the gift be set aside, in which case it would pass
by the will and he would receive his 50% share of the $800,000, that is, $400,000. The sisters
claim, by contrast, is that mother fully intended to make the gift and she made it out of
appreciation for the personal and career sacrices that the sister had made. She claims the
full $800,000 is rightfully hers. At stake, therefore, is $400,000.
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The instructions state that the brother is seeking to set aside the gift under the doctrine
of undue inuence, and give a clear denition of the doctrine and the standards that apply.
There are then two possible conditions. Under the winner-take-all condition, we explain
that the judge will nd for either the sister or the brother. We explain the judgesoptions
to the brother this way:
If the judge nds that the transfer was the product of undue inuence, then
you will receive the entire $400,000 in dispute and your sister will receive nothing.
If the judge nds that the transfer was not the product of undue inuence, then
you will receive nothing, and your sister will receive the $400,000 in dispute.
There is a parallel representation to the sister.
Under the judicial discretion condition we replace the paragraph above with this wording
for both the brother and sister:
The judge will consider all of the facts and circumstances and will make a
fair and equitable distribution of the $400,000 in dispute. This will result in you
being paid somewhere between $0 and $400,000.
Other than these two paragraphs, the instructions and case materials are identical under the
two conditions.
4.2 Implementation
The subjects were volunteers from undergraduate courses at the University of Wisconsin in
November, 2005. Each session of the experiment required 20 subjects. As subjects arrived
they were randomly assigned a subject number and role in the study. All those in the role
of the brother (role A in the experiment) were on one side of the room, and those in the role
of the sister (role B) were on the other side, and the two were separated by a room divider.
However, both sides could see the experimenter and see the projection screen at the front
of the room. Thus, everyone was able to verify that both roles had the same instructions,
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but no two negotiators could ever discover which of the 10 participants of the other role was
their partner. We ran two sessions of each condition for a total of 80 subjects. Each session
was completed in about one hour.
Subjects were rst told that they had earned a $12 participation fee. After explaining
the bargaining task, they were told that they would earn an additional $3 for every $100,000
they were awarded as a result of either negotiation or a judges court order. If they went to
court, however, they would each pay $10,000 in attorneys fees. For instance, if they were
to negotiate an even split of the $400,000 they would each get $18. However if one side were
to win everything in court, the winner would get $23.70 and the loser would get $11.70.
Subjects negotiated for settlement over a computer chatroom. The user interface was
deliberately designed with the look and feel of standard Internet chatrooms with which
college students are familiar. After reviewing the instructions aloud with subjects, they were
given 15 minutes to silently review their case materials and prepare for the negotiation. They
were then given 15 minutes in which to negotiate. A clock on their chatroom screen counted
down the time, and ashed red when one minute remained. To propose a settlement, a
subject used a window in the chatroom program to formally send a proposal. Proposals and
counter-proposals could be sent and revised at any time. An agreement was reached when
one subject accepted the others proposal. This was done by clicking the button marked
Accept Proposal. If they failed to reach an agreement in the allotted time, the case would
go to court and they would receive an amount determined by the judge. Only those
subjects who failed to reach agreement learned the judges decision.
How did we determine the outcome of going to court? As indicated in the instructions
to the subjects, we asked a state judge to read the case materials seen by the subjects and to
make a decision. The judge, who also serves on the faculty at Boston College Law School,
ruled in favor of the sister under winner-take-all, but awarded $50,000 to the brother under
judicial discretion.
Before beginning negotiations, subjects were asked four questions intended to measure
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overcondence. Subjects were asked 1) their best estimate about what would happen if they
were to go to court, 2) how condent they were in their answer to this question, 3) whether
they thought there truly was undue inuence (rated on a ve point scale), and 4) what they
thought was a fair division of the $400,000. Ideally, we hoped to nd that subjects in
the two conditions had equal amounts of overcondence, that is, we wanted to be sure that
the treatment variable is only acting on disagreement and not the degree of overcondence.
Notice that since the possible court outcomes are, by design, di¤erent across conditions,
the answer to question (1) would not be directly comparable in measuring overcondence.
Instead, we used their belief about what is most fair allocation (question 4), and their beliefs
about whether undue inuence had occurred (question 3) as measures of overcondence.
The answers to questions 3 and 4 were, however, highly correlated with their predictions of
the courts decision.
After negotiating and learning the outcome, subjects were given a follow up ques-
tionnaire asking them, among other things, to write a denition of undue inuence. All
subjects were able to describe this concept accurately. Copies of the instructions, ques-
tionnaire, case materials, user interface, and two sample transcripts are presented in the
appendix. Transcripts of all the negotiations are available from the authors.
5 Results
There were 20 pairs of bargainers under winner-take-all and 20 pairs under judicial discretion.
Our prediction was that we should have more disagreement and fewer settlements in winner-
take-all. As shown in Table 1, this was exactly what we found. Fifty percent of bargainers
agreed under judicial discretion, but only 25% agreed under winner-take all. Using a simple
t-test, this di¤erence is signicant beyond the 1% level (t = 2:39): There was also evidence
of more delay under winner-take-all. Measuring the time remaining in the bargaining
period at agreement for just those pairs who ultimately agreed, a Mann-Whitney test showed
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signicant less time remaining for winner-take-all than for judicial discretion (z =  4:76):13
What about the allocation in agreement? Our theory makes no prediction on this, and the
data reveal no systematic di¤erences: the Mann-Whitney z = 0:61:
Table 1
Agreements: Allocation to the Brother
And Time Remaining in Bargaining Period
Winner-Take-All Judicial Discretion
Amount Time Left Amount Time Left
200 10:19 200 12:41
350 9:28 200 12:27
250 1:35 200 8:42
225 0:18 200 4:46






The rest of this section will attempt to tie these results more clearly to the hypothesis
of the paper, that winner-take-all is magnifying the e¤ect of overcondence to create more
delay and disagreement.
5.1 Overcondence
To establish that the premises for our theory are met, we need to demonstrate that the
subjects were indeed overcondent and that the degree of overcondence was the same across
the conditions. Table 2 conrms this. The table shows the answers to the pre-negotiations
questions for both player roles and judicial doctrines. Look rst at question 1, where we
asked subjects to state the most likely outcome in court. To make the answers comparable
across treatments, we code an answer of 200 or more for brother under judicial discretion
as the same as saying that the brother wins under winner-take all. The 2 tests show that
players of the two roles are signicantly di¤erent on their answers, indicating signicant
13An unconditional test of all bargaining pairs, where time remaining equals 0 for disagreement, also shows
a signifcant increase in delay under winner-take-all. The Mann-Whitney z =  8:55:
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overcondence, but comparing across conditions nds no signicant di¤erence. Question 2
shows that subjects of both roles are fairly condent of there forecasts in question 1, with
no signicant di¤erences in condence either between roles or between treatments. Question
3 shows that the brother is signicantly more likely than the sister to believe that undue
inuence occurred.14 Question 4 shows that each side feels a distribution in their favor
is most fair, again with a statistically signicant di¤erence. Neither question 3 nor 4,
however, show di¤erences between winner-take-all and judicial discretion. Any e¤ects of the
treatment, therefore, will be pure treatment e¤ects and not due to any interaction between
the treatment and overcondence.
Table 2
Average Responses to the Pre-negotiation Questions and 2 Tests for Di¤erences
For Both Player roles and Winner-take-all (WTA) and Judicial Discretion (JD) Conditions
Player Roles 2
A: Brother B : Sister WTA vs. JD
WTA JD WTA JD A vs. By A B
1. Guess of judges allocation to A. 280 245 100 104
Number greater than 200 14 11 5 1 17.1 0.1 0.0
2. Condence in answer to 1.
1=great deal, 2=some, 2.00 2.05 1.75 1.70 4.7 0.3 0.2
3=hardly any
3. Was there was undue inuence?
1 to 5 scale: 1=Yes, denitely 2.00 1.90 2.95 3.50 27.8 0.3 3.3
to 5=No, denitely
4. Most fair allocation to A. 318 318 115 109 52.4 0.2 1.1
yThe degrees of freedom for the four 2 tests are 1, 2, 4 and 2 respectively. To test 4, data was grouped into three
categories, 0-199, 200, 201-400. Values of 2in bold show di¤erences signicant beyond the 0.01 level.
5.2 Disagreement, Delay and Judicial Doctrine
Next we ask whether, for a given level of overcondence, the judicial doctrine causes dis-
agreement or delay in bargaining.
14The range of answers for the daughter was 1 to 3. That is, no daughter felt there was undue inuence.
For the sons, however, the range was 2 to 5. Nine out of 40 answered 2 no, probably while the rest
answered maybe, not sure,yes, probably,or yes, denitely.
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Table 3 reports the marginal e¤ect from Probit regressions, where the dependent variable
equals 1 if the bargainers reach an out-of-court settlement. Regression (1) is simply a
baseline regression taking no account of the level of overcondence. We see winner-take-all
results in an increase in disagreement by 25 percentage points. Regressions (2) through (6)
explore di¤erent ways to account for the condence of the bargainers. The rst variable,
Di¤erence in Fairness, is simply the brothers answer to pre-question 4 minus the sisters
answer, expressed in $100,000s. The second variable, Di¤erence in Undue Inuence, is the
brothers answer to pre-question 3 minus the sisters answer. This variable can range from
4 to -4, although in our sample the range was 4 to -1. Finally, Disagree on Undue Inuence
converts the answers to pre-question 3 to a binary variable equal to 1 if the brother answered
Yes, Denitely, Yes, Probably, or Maybe, Not Surewhile the sister answered No,
Probably,or No, Denitely. It also equals 1 if the brother answered Yes, Denitely,
or Yes, Probably, while the sister answered Maybe, Not Sure, No, Probably,or No,
Denitely. It equals 0 otherwise.
Table 3
Settlement: Probit Average Marginal E¤ect, with Dependent Variable
Equal to 1 if the Parties Settle Out of Court
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winner-take-all -0.25 -0.28 -0.43 -0.47 -0.41 -0.46
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Di¤erence in Fairness -0.15 -0.08 -0.11
(pre-question 4 in $100K) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Di¤erence in Undue Inuence -0.22 -0.17
(pre-question 3) (0.09) (0.1)
Disagree on Undue Inuence: -0.53 -0.45
(0 if both yes or both no on pre-3) (0.19) (0.21)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23
*Bold is signicant at 0.05 level. Italic is signicant at 0.10 level
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Table 3 shows that accounting for overcondence greatly increases the e¤ect of winner-
take-all. Each of the three measures of overcondence is signicant when entered individ-
ually. Since they are correlated, they lose some signicance when any two of them are
considered jointly. Nonetheless, the e¤ect of winner-take-all remains fairly stable and sig-
nicant. This means that, all else equal, moving from a doctrine of judicial discretion to
winner-take-all will reduce the probability of an out-of-court settlement by 28 to 47 percent-
age points.
We nd similar e¤ects if we look at delay. Table 4 shows the results of Tobit analysis
of time remaining in the bargaining period when an agreement is reached. If an agreement
is never reached, the dependant variable is censored at zero. Using the same independent
variables, we again see that winner-take-all causes signicant delay. Combined with the
results of Table 3, this provides a strong endorsement of our theory.
Table 4
Delay: Tobit Regressions, with Dependent Variable
Equal to the Time Remaining when Negotiators Reach an Agreement,
and Equal to Zero if No Agreement is Reached.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winner-take-all -4.15 -4.21 -7.20 -7.21 -6.10 -6.37
(2.78) (2.32) (2.86) (2.82) (2.59) (2.47)
Di¤erence in Fairness -3.33 -2.26 -2.43
(pre-question 4 in $100K) (1.06) (1.09) (.97)
Di¤erence in Undue Inuence -3.82 -2.37
(pre-question 3) (1.30) (1.29)
Disagree on Undue Inuence: -8.72 -6.01
(0 if both yes or both no on pre-3) (2.84) (2.55)
Constant -0.60 6.45 5.72 7.12 8.14 9.33
(1.91) (2.33) (2.35) (2.64) (2.42) (2.60)
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14
*Bold is signicant at 0.05 level. Italic is signicant at 0.10 level
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6 Summary and Conclusions
Institutional rules for resolving disputes can have costly unintended consequences. We
illustrate this with judicial doctrine of winner-take-all as compared to judicial discretion.
Our theoretical models showed that winner-take-all magnies the e¤ects of overcondence
by concentrating all of the bias at the most extreme outcome of winning it all,and thereby
undermines chances for pre-trial negotiations to reach agreement. This model can explain
the empirical observation that will contests end up in court at far greater rates than other
litigation. We use a laboratory experiment to conrm our claims, and nd evidence of both
overcondence among bargainers and greater disagreement under winner-take-all.
This nding is particularly remarkable given the likely role of risk aversion. Since winner-
take-all redistributes the possible court outcomes to the tails of the distribution, it increases
risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). This would mean that risk averse bargainers should be
more likely to settle under winner-take-all. Risk aversion, therefore, works in the opposite
direction of overcondence, making both the empirical nding about will contests and our
experimental nding all the more powerful.
We see at least three other areas where winner-take-all rules may be contributing to
disagreements in bargaining. First is the general area of laws about property, including
disputes on real estate boundaries, abandoned property, or squattersrights. These cases,
like will disputes, are often decided on a winner-take-all basis and, therefore, may discourage
settlement by the parties involved.
A second and particularly timely application of this issue is to patent rights. Prior
to 2006, it was generally understood that the remedy for a successful patent infringement
case is that the court would award an injunction prohibiting the infringer from practicing
the patented invention. This rule gave the holder of the patent tremendous leverage in any
subsequent negotiation with the infringer of the patent, and essentially constituted a winner-
take-all system in that if patent infringement was found, then the holder of the patent would
get everythingand if there was no infringement of a patent then the alleged patent holder
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would get nothing. The Supreme Court recently moved away from this all-or-nothing rule
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840-41 (2006), a case involving
the popular web-auction site eBay and patent rights to the buy nowbutton used on the
website. The Court gave greater discretion to judges by rejecting the prior rule that a
nding of patent infringement automatically warranted an injunction.15. This decision gives
judges greater discretion in awarding remedies in patent disputes and, based on our ndings,
should result in more negotiated settlements between the parties.
A third application is to private contracts that include xed penalties for breach, called
liquidated damages.If courts were to consistently uphold liquidated damages claims, this
would create a winner-take-all system which could impede settlement of recontracting dis-
putes, resulting in lower e¢ ciency. However, courts have not taken this approach with
liquidated damages provisions. Although courts quite often cite the general provision that,
under the fundamental principle of freedom of contracts, parties have a broad right to stip-
ulate damages in the event of breach, in fact a variety of circumstances in which courts will
refuse to enforce the liquidated damages provision bind on public policy grounds.16 Under
our theory, this overlay of judicial discretion should encourage settlement by parties.
What do our results tell us about optimal institutional design? If e¢ ciency is an im-
portant concern for the courts, this analysis may indicate that judicial doctrines that allow
judges or juries discretion will be more socially desirable. As our theoretical analysis shows
and our experimental evidence conrms, the judicial doctrine of winner-take-all, while so-
cially benign with unbiased litigants, can have unintended negative consequences in the more
realistic situation that litigants are overcondent.
15Rather, in order to get an injunction, the holder of the patent must, in addition, show that the traditional
four part test for injunctive relief has been met.
16See the Williston on Contracts Database updated May 2007, Richard A. Lord, Chapter 65, Liquidated
Damages and Penalties I. Introduction § 65:1, Validity of provisions for liquidated damages, generally.
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7 Appendix
Contents of the Appendix:
1. SubjectsInstructions
2. Sample Negotiation Chatroom Screen
3. Fact Pattern for Person A
4. Fact Pattern for Person B
5. Manipulations for Fact Patterns
6. Pre-negotiation Questionnaire
7. Sample Transcript: Judicial Discretion, Agreement (highlights added)






Welcome and thank you for participating. Just for agreeing to participate today we will 
start you off with $12. The amount that you will ultimately be paid today will be between 
$11.70 and $24, and will depend in part on the judgments of you and the other 





This study concerns a legal dispute involving a person who has recently died. The facts 
you will read are based on a real life situation.  The dispute involves $400,000. There are 
two people who have competing claims to this money, and they disagree about how much 
each person deserves to inherit.  
  
In this study, we are going to ask you to assume the identity and legal rights of one of the 
people involved in this dispute. Your task in the experiment is to evaluate your legal 
position (as laid out in the fact pattern) and then to resolve the dispute, either by settling 
with the other person or by “going to court” and getting the amount awarded by the 
judge.  
 
Part of this study will involve your assessment of what you think a judge is likely to 






The amount of money you earn in this experiment will be based on two factors: (1) your 
share of the inheritance, and (2) any legal fees that you incur.  
 
Your Share of the Inheritance: We will pay you $3 for each $100,000 of the estate that 
you inherit-- either as awarded by the judge or as negotiated in the out of court 
settlement. For example, if you inherit $300,000, we will pay you $9.  If you inherit 
$110,000 then we will pay you $3.30. These amounts are in addition to the $12 
participation fee that we will give you for participating in today’s experiment.  
 
• If you decide to go to court, the amount that you inherit will be the amount 
awarded by the judge. Prior to this experiment, we had a real probate 
judge render a decision in this case based on the law described in the case. 
That decision is in a sealed envelope.  
 
• If you reach a negotiated settlement, the amount that you inherit will be 
the amount that you agree to with the other party to the dispute. 
Reduction for Legal Fees: If you choose to go to court (or if you do not reach a 
negotiated settlement), you will need to pay the legal fees and your award will be reduced 
by $0.30 to reflect $10,000 of additional legal costs associated with going to court. Thus, 
if you are awarded $350,000 by a court, you will receive $10.50 plus your $12 
participation fee minus a $0.30 court fee, for a total amount of $22.20. In some cases this 
can result in you receiving less than your full $12 participation fee. For example, if you 
decide to go to court and a court awards you $0, you will receive your $12 participation 
fee minus a $0.30 court fee, for a total amount of $11.70. If you reach a negotiated 
settlement, you do not need to pay legal fees.  
 
 
How You Discuss an Out of Court Settlement 
 
Your task is to decide whether to let the case be determined by going to court, in which 
case you will get the amount awarded by the judge, or to reach a negotiated settlement.  
 
In negotiating a settlement you may appeal to anything that you believe will be 
persuasive in getting an agreement.  
 
All of your discussions for an out-of-court settlement will be conducted over the 
computer.  The person assuming the role of the other possible heir to the estate is another 
person in the study today.  However, we will never reveal the identity of this other person 
to you, nor will we reveal your identity to the other person.  Moreover, the experimenters 
will never record your name anywhere.  Your identity and decisions are kept perfectly 
private.  For this reason, please do not reveal any personal information about yourself, 
such as your name or what you look like, that would help the other person in the 
experiment identify you.  Also, please do not ask the other person to reveal something 
that could identify him or her. 
 
You will communicate with the other person using a computer.  This screen allows 
conversation in a “chat room” format.  The top box records the messages sent between 
you and the other person.  Below this is a text box where you can enter your message.   
 
The box at the bottom can be used to send a proposed settlement, or to accept a proposal 
made by the other person.   You can send a proposed settlement to the other person by 
filling in the form called Send a Proposal and clicking SEND PROPOSAL.  The most 
recently proposed settlement is shown in the box below this.  If the other person has 
proposed a settlement that you want to accept, click the button labeled ACCEPT 
PROPOSAL.   
 
Important: Discussions end when one of the two people accepts a proposal made by the 
other person.   We will use this agreement as the basis for your earnings today. 
 
You will have 15 minutes to discuss the case and agree upon a proposal before the case 
goes to court.  The clock at the top of the screen that will count down the time until the 
case goes to court.  If the case goes to court, we will use the judge’s ruling to determine 
your earnings for the study. 
 
Note, we will wait the full 15 minutes before we begin to calculate and prepare your 
monetary payoffs.  Hence, even if you and the other person reach an agreement before 






Your case materials are in the envelope at your desk.  Please read and study the case 
materials carefully.   Try your best to imagine yourself in the role of the person in this 
case.  You may assume this person’s identity during your discussions for a settlement.  
 
We will give you 15 minutes to read the materials and prepare your thoughts before we 
begin out-of-court discussions. 
 
Thank you and good luck! 
 
 
   
FACT PATTERN A 
 
 You are a 46 year old man. Your father died eight years ago and your mother died 
this year at the age of 78. Your mother’s will provides that her estate is to be divided 
evenly between you and your sister. However, you recently learned that three months 
before her death, your mother transferred a bank account with a large amount of money,  
$800,000, to your sister, effectively cutting you out from sharing in that account under 
your mother’s will.  If your mother had not made this transfer, you would have inherited 
$400,000 from this account (that is, 50% of the $800,000), and your sister would have 
inherited $400,000.  Instead you inherited nothing from this account. 
 
 You are a lawyer. You used to live near your parents’ home, but five years ago 
you accepted a job in Washington, D.C.  This job has been great for your career, but due 
to the demanding nature of the work, it kept you from being able to visit your mother as 
much as you would have liked. Nonetheless, you were always a devoted son; you called 
often and visited when you could.  
 
 Your sister is a single mother of a 10 year old girl. She is an artist and has not 
been able to support herself and her daughter through her work. Two years ago your 
sister moved back into the family home to live with your mother. At first you were happy 
about this as it seemed to provide a mutually beneficial situation for both your mother 
and sister: your sister and niece lived rent-free, while your mother had close 
companionship.  However, in recent years you became concerned.  As your mother 
showed signs of aging (she was often confused and increasingly dependent on your sister 
to make even the simplest decisions for her), you became apprehensive that your sister 
seemed to be controlling your mother both financially and emotionally. Moreover, you 
suspect that your sister worked to turn your mother against you. Several times when you 
called your mother, your sister answered the phone and refused to put you through 
(claiming your mother was napping). Your sister didn’t even tell you when your mother 
was hospitalized in the months prior to her death.  
 
 All of your fears were confirmed when you learned of the transfer of the bank 
account. It’s not just the money that bothers you, it is the principle of the thing: your 
mother clearly wanted you and your sister to share her estate equally and you feel it is 
important to uphold your mother’s wishes.    
 
 You consulted a lawyer who told you that you could challenge the transfer based 
on the legal doctrine of undue influence. The lawyer explained to you that undue 
influence is more than just influence or persuasion. Rather, it is influence so extreme that 
it causes the person to do something that is contrary to her true wishes. In other words, 
the issue for the court in an undue influence case is whether the transfer reflected your 
mother’s true wishes or whether it was the product of overreaching by your sister. Your 
lawyer is very experienced and he told you that he believes you have a strong case.   
 
 Your lawyer told you that unless you and your sister reach an out of court 
settlement on how to divide the disputed $400,000, the judge will make a decision as to 
the allocation of the disputed money.   
 
If the judge finds that the transfer was the product of undue influence, then you 
will receive the entire $400,000 in dispute and your sister will receive nothing.  If the 
judge finds that the transfer was not the product of undue influence, then you will receive 
nothing, and your sister will receive the $400,000 in dispute. 
 
 Your lawyer also advised you that it will cost $10,000 to litigate the case in court 
in the event that you do not reach a negotiated agreement.  
   
FACT PATTERN B 
 
 You are a 43 year old woman. You are a freelance commercial artist and a single 
mother of a 10 year old girl. Your father died eight years ago. Two years ago you moved 
from New York City (where your career had just begun to take off) back to your parents’ 
home so that your mother would not be alone. Over the past two years you spent much of 
your time devoted to your mother’s care. You made sure she took her medicines, drove 
her to her appointments and helped her pay her bills and manage her finances. Over the 
past year these tasks took up more and more time as your mother showed signs of 
aging—she was often confused and increasingly depended on you to make decisions for 
her. Between taking care of your mother and your daughter you had little time left to 
focus on your career. Nonetheless, you felt like you had made the right choices. You 
were deeply saddened when your mother died this past year at the age of 78. 
 
 You have a brother who is three years older than you who is a very successful 
lawyer working in Washington, D.C. You and your brother have always been very 
different types of people and never particularly close, although prior to recent events, 
there has never been any animosity between you.  
 
 Three months before your mother died, you drove her to her bank so that she 
could change her bank account to provide that you would get the money in the account,  
$800,000, at the time of her death, rather than having it pass through her estate to you and 
your brother.  If your mother had not made this transfer, you would have inherited 
$400,000 from this account (that is, 50% of the $800,000) and your brother would also 
have inherited $400,000.  Instead your brother inherited nothing from this account. 
 
  You were glad that your mother finally saw things your way. After all, you were 
the one with the difficult financial situation as well as the only one with a child (not to 
mention the one who had sacrificed a career to take care of her).  Moreover, your brother 
neither needed nor deserved the money. As you told your mother, he has been far from 
devoted. He didn’t even come see her when she was in the hospital. 
 
 Your brother is very well-off financially and has no dependants. Moreover, he is 
well aware of how much you and your daughter have been struggling financially since 
you moved back home. He should be incredibly appreciative for everything that you did 
for your mother. Therefore, you were completely taken aback when your brother told you 
that he had consulted a lawyer and was planning to challenge the gift based on undue 
influence. It’s not just the money that bothers you, it is the principle of the thing: your 
mother clearly wanted you and your daughter to have this money and you feel it is 
important to uphold your mother’s wishes.    
 
 You consulted a lawyer who explained to you that undue influence is more than 
just influence or persuasion. Rather, it is influence so extreme that it overrides the 
person’s free agency and causes her to do something that is contrary to her true wishes.  
In other words, the issue for the court in an undue influence case is whether the gift by 
 your mother of the bank account reflected your mother’s true wishes or whether it was 
the product of overreaching by you. You were hurt and angry when you realized what 
your brother was accusing you of, and thought it was particularly outrageous in light of 
the fact that your brother had been focusing on his career while you devoted yourself to 
your mother’s care. Your lawyer is very experienced and he told you that you he believes 
you have a strong case.   
  
Your lawyer told you that unless you and your brother reach an out of court 
settlement on how to divide the disputed $400,000, the judge will make a decision as to 
the allocation of the disputed money.   
 
If the judge finds that the transfer was not the product of undue influence, then 
you will receive the entire $400,000 in dispute and your brother will receive nothing.  If 
the judge finds that the transfer was the product of undue influence, then you will receive 
nothing, and your brother will receive the $400,000 in dispute. 
 
 The lawyer also advised you that it will cost $10,000 to litigate the case in court 
in the event that you do not reach a negotiated agreement.  
 




If the judge finds that the transfer was the product of undue influence, then you 
will receive the entire $400,000 in dispute and your sister will receive nothing.  If the 
judge finds that the transfer was not the product of undue influence, then you will receive 
nothing, and your sister will receive the $400,000 in dispute. 
 
B: 
If the judge finds that the transfer was not the product of undue influence, then 
you will receive the entire $400,000 in dispute and your brother will receive nothing.  If 
the judge finds that the transfer was the product of undue influence, then you will receive 
nothing, and your brother will receive the $400,000 in dispute. 
 
 
For 2)  
For both A and B:  
 
The judge will consider all of the facts and circumstances and will make a fair and 
equitable distribution of the $400,000 in dispute. This will result in you being paid 





        Participant Number ______ 
Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire 
After reading the facts of the case, but before you negotiate, please answer the following 
questions: 
1. If the case goes to court, what is your best guess of the judge’s decision? 
[Alternative i: ]  
Check one: 
__ The transfer of the bank account is upheld and the daughter gets the disputed 
$400,000 and the son gets nothing. 
__ The transfer of the bank account is rejected and the son gets the disputed $400,000 
and the daughter gets nothing. 
[Alternative ii: ]  
Fill in amounts that sum to $400,000 
 
Amount to the son ____________           Amount to the daughter ____________  
 
2. How much confidence do you have in your answer to the question above?  
__ great deal of confidence   __ only some confidence    __ hardly any confidence 
3.  Do you think the daughter exerted “undue influence” on her mother’s decision to 
transfer the bank account three months before her death? 
 
        ___ Yes, definitely. 
        ___ Yes, probably. 
        ___ Maybe, not sure 
        ___ No, probably. 
        ___ No, definitely. 
 
4. What do you consider is a fair division of the disputed $400,000 in this case?   
(Fill in amounts that sum to $400,000)  
 
Amount to the son ____________           Amount to the daughter ____________  
Sample Transcript 1: Judicial Discretion, Agreement 
 
Group 5 
Player A: 2 
Player B: 9 
 
(14:53 remaining) Person B: hey bro 
(14:49 remaining) Person A: hello 
(14:44 remaining) Person A: where do we start? 
(14:31 remaining) Person B: so you think i conned mother into giving me all the money? 
(14:17 remaining) Person A: do you see any possible settlement before court or not a 
chance? 
(14:05 remaining) Person A: it certainly would appear that way 
(14:02 remaining) Person B: possibly 
(13:54 remaining) Person B: i also see a settlement here too 
(13:39 remaining) Person B: how much you think you deserve? 
(13:11 remaining) Person A: ultimately i feel it is justified to recieve the 400,000 because 
that was the original half of the account 
(13:00 remaining) Person A: i realize that will not happen otherwise we wouldnt be here 
(12:26 remaining) Person B: however, i was the one who has cared for her every need for 
the past 2 years 
(12:19 remaining) Person B: i gave up my career for her 
(11:59 remaining) Person B: i gave up any chance to make a decent living 
(11:55 remaining) Person B: all for her 
(11:47 remaining) Person A: what distinguishes you giving up your career to help vs 
having no career and depending on her 
(11:28 remaining) Person B: so i think i t is completely justified to think that i deserve at 
least more than half of the inheritance 
(11:27 remaining) Person A: your choice to be an artist was one made many years prior 
to moving in with mother 
(11:17 remaining) Person A: i would agree with that statement 
(11:02 remaining) Person A: i am willing to give you more than half since i know what 
you have given up for her 
(10:48 remaining) Person A: would you consider a percentage split? 
(10:40 remaining) Person B: 25:75 
(10:27 remaining) Person B: i mean, you 25, me 75 
(10:27 remaining) Person A: 25 extra to you and 75 of the 400000 to me? 
(9:42 remaining) Person B: not only will it go towrds supporting me, but my daughter 
also 
(9:40 remaining) Person A: as in you get 700000 and i get 100000 
(9:33 remaining) Person B: yes 
(8:57 remaining) Person B: seem fair to you? 
(8:56 remaining) Person A: just because your lifestyle is one that includes a dependant 
does not change the amount that you should get 
(8:45 remaining) Person A: me being single should not punish me 
(8:16 remaining) Person B: i understand that, but my daughter was also helpoed out 
immesnsely with taking care of mother 
(8:10 remaining) Person B: it wasnt solely me 
(8:01 remaining) Person B: she had to make many sacrafices to 
(7:59 remaining) Person B: o 
(7:59 remaining) Person A: i was thinking more along the lines of 60/40 since you will be 
residing at her house now that it is empty, you also inherited the house 
(7:22 remaining) Person A: she is not legally an adult nor was she included in the will, 
therefor the judge will not view her in the decision 
(6:45 remaining) Person B: you are very well of as it is, and you dont need the monay as 
nearly as much as i can use it 
(6:04 remaining) Person B: you probably cant even use all of it, without wasting it away 
(5:57 remaining) Person A: that will not be a deterant in court, regardless of you needing 
the money more, it is who is entitled to it under the law that matters 
(5:48 remaining) Person B: i understand that 
(5:12 remaining) Person A: so i am most certain that i can earn more than 100000 if we 
would go to court, and i am more than willing to pay lawyer fees 
(4:45 remaining) Person B: so how much are you proposing at the current moment 
(3:13 remaining) Person A: 65me/35 you which is an extra 140000 for you, or a total of 
540000 to my 260000 
(3:04 remaining) Person A: so youre still coming out with 2 times what i have 
(2:51 remaining) Person B: fair deal 
(2:40 remaining) Person A: you agree to that 
(2:38 remaining) Person B: i do 
(2:23 remaining) Person A proposed $260000 for themselves and $140000 for their 
partner. 
(2:09 remaining) Person B accepts the offer.
 Sample Transcript 2: Winner-take-all, Disagreement 
 
Group 2 
Player A: 12 
Player B: 3 
 
(14:02 remaining) Person A: would you like to settle 
(13:44 remaining) Person B: what is it that you suggest? 
(13:08 remaining) Person A: i feel that since you were with mother last, i would like to 
know how you feel 
(11:40 remaining) Person A: with all due respect, you should do what's in your heart 
(10:55 remaining) Person B: I spent the last two years putting my career on hold in order 
to care for her. I uprooted my daughter from her original home in order for her to get to 
know our mother before she past. I acted as mother's taxi, nurse, and took care of her 
bills. Since i am in a finacail pinch I believe that this is a type of payment for the acts that 
I have done for her. 
(10:35 remaining) Person B: Also it is not like you will not recieve any of the estate 
(10:25 remaining) Person B: the rest we will split 50 50. 
(10:12 remaining) Person B: therefore i feel entitled to the whole amount. 
(10:03 remaining) Person B: it was mother's wish 
(9:33 remaining) Person B proposed $400000 for themselves and $0 for their partner. 
(9:18 remaining) Person A: you have quite the argument, but on the other hand, why did 
you treat me the way you did when I tried to get in contact with mother? 
(9:03 remaining) Person B: can you elaborate? 
(7:03 remaining) Person A: when i called the house, everytime i would call, you would 
pick up the phone and claim mother was sleeping. I was a good son and it was like i was 
being blocked from communication from my own mother, besides, her will clearly stated 
that $200,000 goes to me and $200,000 goes to you 
(6:35 remaining) Person A: mothers final wishes should be carried out by us splitting it in 
half 
(6:21 remaining) Person A: that is the rightous thing to do 
(6:06 remaining) Person A: im sure you feel the same way 
(5:26 remaining) Person A: your proposal seems a bit unfair, don't you think. i truly feel 
you should reconsider 
(4:18 remaining) Person B: unfortunately whenever you called mother was sleeping. I 
regret that you feel that you were being blocked. That was never my entention. However, 
I would like to point out that dad died eight years ago. Mother has been very sick for a 
little over two. You have not come home one time. I understand that you are very busy 
with you career, yet no matter what has happened between you and me you could have 
come home to see Mother during the last few years of her life.  
(4:02 remaining) Person B: You have not been in communication with mother for some 
time now 
(3:56 remaining) Person B: people change there minds. 
(3:38 remaining) Person B: during thelast few years, mother changed her mind about the 
inheritance 
(3:05 remaining) Person A: yes people change their minds, but when other people change 
their minds for them, it loses it validity 
(2:45 remaining) Person B: i'm sorry you feel that way 
(2:35 remaining) Person A: mother did not officially change her mind about the 
inheritance 
(2:32 remaining) Person B: is there a settlement you would like to suggest? 
(2:19 remaining) Person B: yes she did. 
(2:09 remaining) Person B: she was the one at the bank doing the transactions 
(2:01 remaining) Person B: i did not  
(1:32 remaining) Person A: im not gonna argue with you, that childish, it hurts me to hear 
you say that you feel you deserve everything (keeping in mind your proposal) 
(1:02 remaining) Person B proposed $300000 for themselves and $100000 for their 
partner. 
(0:48 remaining) Person A: why the hell didn't you tell me mother was in the hospital  
(0:28 remaining) Person A: let split it 200000 for me and 200000 for u 
(0:18 remaining) Person A proposed $200000 for themselves and $200000 for their 
partner. 
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